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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-4-i03(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
a. Res judicata.
i) The Court below held that Appellant's claims were barred by res
judicata.
ii) Standard of Review. "[A]ppellant argues only that the... petition was
barred by res judicata. Therefore, this appeal presents a question of law. Accepting
the trial court's factual findings, we review its conclusions of law for correctness,
according them no particular deference." In re: J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161,162 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
b. Rule 11 Sanctions.
i) The Court below granted Appellees' Motion for sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P.
ii) Standard of Review. "When reviewing a trial court's Rule 11
determination, we review the trial court's findings of fact under a clearly
erroneous standard, the trial court's conclusion that Rule 11 was violated under a
correction of error standard, and the trial court's determination of the type and
amount of sanction to be imposed under an abuse of discretion standard."
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) citing
Barnard v. Sutlijf, 846 P.2d 1229,1235 (Utah 1992).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a. Nature of the case: This appeal is from two final Orders issued by the
Honorable Judge Robert K. Hilder, in the Third Judicial District Court for
Summit County, Utah, on motions to dismiss made by Defendants/Appellees
("Appellees") and on a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. This dispute is about access
to a parcel of land that is essentially landlocked. As a result of a prior
interpretation of a settlement agreement between some persons related to the
parties in this action, the parcel of property is accessible only to
Plaintiff/Appellant ("Gillmor") and a few others and only for very limited
purposes, animal husbandry and hunting. The road to the property has been in
use by the public as a thoroughfare for at least one hundred years for numerous
purposes.
b. Course of the proceedings: Gillmor filed a Complaint seeking private
condemnation and/or "highway-by-use" over Appellees' lands. Appellees filed
Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing judicial estoppel and res
judicata. Gillmor opposed the Motions to Dismiss, arguing that her Complaint
contains new claims, parties not included in the previous actions and on other
grounds. Appellees also filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions.
c. Disposition at trial court: The District Court below granted the Motion
to Dismiss only on the grounds of res judicata. Following the Order Granting the
Motion to Dismiss, Appellees were also granted Rule 11(b)(2) sanctions.
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RELEVANT FACTS
Gillmor owns property that is effectively landlocked as a result of
topography and a prior court ruling. See, Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App 351.
The Appellees own lands that stand between Gillmor's property and the most
convenient presently declared public road. The Appellees have been unwilling to
allow Gillmor to have reasonable access to her property. This action was brought
under two unconventional legal theories to gain Gillmor access to her property "highway-by-use" (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (2001)) and condemnation. This is
the first time an action was brought that includes all the property owners that
block Gillmor's property from access to a road and the first time that these claims
have been raised.
Previously, in 1984, Gillmor's deceased husband, Frank Gillmor, brought
an action against only the largest landowner between Gillmor's property and the
main Weber Canyon Road, David K. Richards. In that action Mr. Gillmor sought
access to the Gillmor property by either a prescriptive easement or an irrevocable
license across Mr. Richards property. That action ended over 20 years ago with a
settlement agreement between Mr. Richards and Mr. Gillmor providing for some
access to the Gillmor property across Mr. Richards' property.
Another action was later brought in 2001 by Ms. Gillmor against Mr.
Richards to determine and enforce the terms of the prior settlement agreement so
that Gillmor and others could continue to access the Gillmor property. That
action ended when the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the settlement
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agreement and left Gillmor's property essentially landlocked, all but for her and a
limited few others for very limited purposes. The Court of Appeals specifically
found that the easement created in the agreement did not run with the land and
would not inure to a future landowner, or even to Gillmor's children (by a
marriage prior to her marriage to Frank Gillmor). Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT
App 351,1f1fi9 and 23.
This action arises not from the 1984 settlement agreement but instead from
Gillmor's statutory rights. Importantly, since the Court of Appeals decision,
"highway-by-use" law has changed in Utah.
In this action, unlike the previous two actions, Gillmor does not seek an
easement over anyone else's property or any legal redress based on the settlement
agreement, instead she brings new claims. Moreover, this action is brought
against all the landowners who block her property from declared public roads, not
just Mr. Richards and his successors-in-interest, in order to access her property.
The Appellees' filed Motions to Dismiss under two theories. The District
Court rejected the Appellees'judicial estoppel argument but granted the Motion
on the grounds of res judicata. Thereafter the Appellees' filed a Motion for Rule
11 Sanctions that the District Court granted.1

1 Gillmor concedes that Appellees followed proper procedure about advance warning
that Appellees would seek Rule 11 sanctions. Appellees gave Gillmor advance warning
that Rule 11 sanctions would be sought under both the res judicata and judicial estoppel
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This case involves new parties and different claims than those previously
decided. Therefore it is not barred by res judicata and sanctions should not have
been granted. See Complaint, Second Amended Complaint and Amended
Complaint, attached to the Docketing Statement as Exhibits D, E and F.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Gillmor's Complaint was not barred by res judicata because these claims
have never been brought and this is the first case to involve all of the landowners
that block Gillmor's property access. Additionally, Rule 11 sanctions were not
appropriate in this case because there was no bad faith and Gillmor (and her
counsel) had no intent to defraud or harass Appellees.
ARGUMENT
I.

No prior legal action was res judicata.

Simply put, res judicata does not apply in this case:
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must
involve the same parties or their privies and also the
same cause of action; and this precludes the relitigation
of all issues that could have been litigated as well as
those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action
theories. The District Court found that the judicial estoppel argument lacked merit.
Gillmor chose not to escalate this tit-for-tat battle by seeking Rule 11 sanctions against
Appellees for their efforts on the judicial estoppel theory.
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Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). Neither of the two requirements for res judicata is met because this suit
involves different parties and this suit involves different causes of action.
Gillmor's case is surprisingly similar to the facts in Schaer, which also
involved multiple lawsuits and property access. In Schaer the State of Utah
condemned 4.6 acres of Schaer's 22.8 acre property to build a highway in 1967.
Schaer asked for and received severance damages because the condemnation
landlocked the remainder of his property. The Court specifically found that the
action left the remainder property with no access.
Over a decade later Schaer instituted another suit seeking an access road to
the remainder of the property so he could develop it for residential use. The Utah
Supreme Court found that res judicata did not bar his second case:
because it is based on a different claim, demand or
cause of action than that of the 1967 litigation. The two
causes of action rest on a different state of facts and
evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to
sustain the two causes of action. Moreover, the evidence
of the two causes of action relates to the status of the
property in two completely different and separate time
periods.
Id. (emphasis added). Gillmor's case is similarly not barred by res judicata since
either a declaration of condemnation or "highway-by-use" to access the property
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require a different state of facts and evidence then interpreting a private
settlement agreement between two parties.
fWlhere the second cause of action between the same
parties is upon a different cause or demand, the
principle of res judicata is applied much more narrowly.
In this situation, the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might
have been litigated and determined, but 'only as to those
matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was
rendered/ Since the cause of action involved in the
second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in
the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which
were not at issue in the first proceeding, even though
such points might have been tendered and decided at
that time.
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added). Gillmor is entitled to have a court determine whether
she can access her property via condemnation or "highway-by-use" due to the
"completely different and separate time period" of the actions and because these
points were "not at issue in the first proceeding". "[W]e resolve all doubts in favor
of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy".

7

BYUv. Tremco, 2006 UT 19, U28 (citation omitted). If there is any doubt whether
res judicata exists here the doubt should be resolved in Gillmor's favor and this
dispute should be remanded to the trial court so that she can have her day in
court.
Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992) also supports
Gillmor's position. In Hill the parties were involved in a contract dispute. A first
action was brought and concluded in federal court regarding the contract
between the parties and then a second action based on the same claims was
brought in state court.
Because we hold that the prior federal court proceeding
never fully

explored the

contractual

relationship

between Hill-Magnum and Seattle First, collateral
estoppel

does

not

prevent

Hill-Mangum

from

relitigating the issue. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).

After the federal court's decision, Hill-Mangum brought
the same claims against Seattle First in state court,
alleging, inter alia, that Seattle First ... breach[ed] an
oral contract with Hill-Mangum. Id. at 244 (emphasis
added).
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We agree that the federal court ruling bars any claim
Hill-Magnum might base on the written agreement.
However, to the extent that the trial court relied on
collateral estoppel to bar an enquiry into the rights
created by an oral agreement, it erred. Id.
Both of the claims in Hill were based in contract yet the Court allowed the second
case to proceed based on an oral contract because the first case only resolved the
written contract. Similarly Gillmor should not be precluded from seeking access
to her property against all landowners that block her access with claims that have
never been brought or reached by any court.
Although the District Court dismissed this action based on res judicata2, an
analysis of why this case should also have not been dismissed on preclusion
grounds is helpful because courts have often overlapped the doctrines of claim
and issue preclusion when deciding a case on res judicata grounds (See, BYUv.
Tremco, 2005 UT 19,1f1f 24 - 38). There are four tests courts apply when
determining if a case is barred by collateral estoppel, also known as preclusion:
1.

Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication

identical with the one presented in the action in
question?

2 It is not clear whether the District Court granted res judiciata on the grounds of the
1984 dispute or the 2001 dispute.
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2. Was there a final judgment on the merits?
3. Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
4. Was the issue in the first case competently, fully, and
fairly litigated?
Schaer at 1340-41. Neither tests one or three are satisfied in this case.
The first test is not satisfied because the 1984 case only involved access to
the property over Mr. Richards' property through a license or an easement. The
2001 case only involved interpreting the agreement that settled the 1984 case.
The current dispute involves access, not as an easement or a license, over all of
the land, not only Mr. Richards', that blocks Gillmor's property. "We [must,
therefore,] determine whether the issues actually litigated in the first action are
precisely the same as those raised in the present action." Schaer at 1341
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). This litigation involves "highway-byuse" and condemnation and "the issue[s] raised in th[is action were] never
litigated in the prior proceeding[s]" so Gillmor's Complaint is not barred by res
judicata. Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 692 (Utah 1978).
The 1967 litigation was a condemnation action which
focused on whether the plaintiffs remaining property
was effectively landlocked. Despite vague and indirect
references to the dugway road, the IQ67 litigation never
focused on the precise issue of whether the dugway road
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was a public thoroughfare under U.C.A., 1953, § 27-1289 [the predecessor to the current Utah Code Ann. §725-104]•X- •*

*

inhere is nothing in its findings to preclude another
court twelve years later from finding that access is not
reasonable, economical and feasible by way of the
dugway road. In any event, neither the findings nor the
judgment entered in the IQ67 case demonstrates that
the court considered and Ruled on the precise issue in
this case...
[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel 'does not apply to
issues that merely could have been tried in the prior
case, but operates only to issues that were actually
asserted and tried in that case'.
Schaer at 1341 (emphasis in original and added) (internal citations omitted).
Similarly, Gillmor's causes of action in this case, condemnation and "highway-byuse", have never been tried or asserted and these claims are not barred by the
prior actions.
Likewise, the third test is not satisfied because this case involves all of the
landowners limiting access to the property. Claim or issue preclusion is only
applicable when the case involves all of the same parties or the parties are all in
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privity. Murdock et al v. Springville Municipal Corp., 1999 UT 39, H13. The
previous actions only involved Mr, Richards or his successors-in-interest, so
preclusion does not bar this action.
II.

Res judicata is additionally inapplicable in this case because there

was a change in the law.
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes "the general Rule that res judicata is
no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has
been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation."
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154,162 (1945)
(emphasis added). The Court of Appeals decision created just such an altered
situation for Gillmor when it lessened the access she believed that she had prior
to the decision so res judicata should not have barred her from bringing this
Complaint.
Additionally there has been a change in the "highway-by-use" law, which
allows Gillmor to bring her Complaint. The change in "highway-by-use" law
supports Gillmor's request for access to her property:
The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems largely
from the fact that we have never set forth a standard for
determining what qualifies as a sufficient interruption
to restart the running of the required ten-year period
under the Dedication Statute. We do so now by setting
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forth a bright-line Rule by which we intend to make
application of the Dedication Statute more predictable:
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and
is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an
interruption sufficient to restart the running of the
required ten-year period under the Dedication Statute.
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, U15 (emphasis added). This change
in law precludes a finding of res judicata on the "highway-by-use" claim in
Gillmor's Complaint.
III.

Sanctions should not have been awarded.

Just because the Appellees' disagreed with Gillmor's position does not mean
that Gillmor's counsel violated Rule 11 or that Appellees' are entitled to sanctions.
All Rule 11 requires is good faith and that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry
into the validity of the action, which Gillmor's attorney did.
Because this action was not brought in contradiction of Rule 11 attorneys' fees
should not have been awarded to the Appellees.
[B]y presenting a pleading ... an attorney ... is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances, (b)(i) it is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause

13

unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation; (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by
a

nonfrivolous

modification,

argument

for

the

extension,

or reversal of existing law or the

establishment of new law.
*

*

*

A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct ... [T]he sanction may consist of, or include,
directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a
penalty into court, or if imposed on motion and
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable
attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct
result of the violation. (c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions
may not be awarded against a represented party for a
violation of subdivision (b)(2).
Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
Rule 11 has not been violated because this action was not frivolous. Before
bringing this case, Gillmor's attorney did the research that Rule 11 requires: "Rule 11
does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive research. The appropriate
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standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all the
circumstances". Hess v. Johnston, 2007 UT App 213,118, quoting Barnard v. Sutliff,
846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992). "Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate where, as
here, counsel's interpretation of existing law is reasonable and there is no evidence
demonstrating counsel's failure to make a reasonable inquiry required by Rule 11".
Id. at U26 (emphasis added).
This case is not similar to Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) where the action was "no different from filing a new Complaint
containing the original claims". Id. at 60, n. 1. Unlike in Schoney, Gillmor and her
counsel, did not merely "file a new Complaint containing the original claims".
Instead Gillmor's attorney researched the law and determined that Gillmor did have
a basis to file this Complaint on these new theories, as explained above.
"Thus, once an attorney forms a reasonable opinion after conducting
appropriate research, the mere fact that the attorney's view of the law was wrong
cannot support a finding of a Rule 11 violation". Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,
1236 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). Here Gillmor filed her Complaint to access
her property and there have been changes in the law since the prior action. The
District Court disagreed with Gillmor and found that her action was barred by res
judicata. However, even ifres judicata barred a Complaint sanctions did not
automatically follow.
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Another important Utah case on sanctionss, Mi Vida Enters, v. Steen-Adams,
2005 UT App 400, also supports the position that sanctions are not appropriate
when an action was brought in good faith. Id. at U16.
To find that a party acted in 'bad faith/ the trial court
must find that one or more of the following factors
existed: (i) the party lacked an honest belief in the
propriety of the activities in question; (ii) the party
intended to take unconscionable advantage of others; or
(iii) the party intended to or acted with the knowledge
that the activities in question would hinder, delay, or
defraud others.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 316 (Utah 1998).
None of the elements of bad faith exist in this case. Gillmor did not intend to take
advantage of the Appellees'. Gillmor did not intend to hinder, delay or defraud the
Appellees'. Gillmor and her attorney honestly believe this case is allowable for

3 This case is a Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56 sanctions case but is applicable because as
the District Court pointed out the bad faith test appears to be the same for Rule 11
sanctions.
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access to her property. Because none of the requirements of bad faith exist the
Court should not have awarded sanctions.

CONCLUSION
Gillmor's action is not barred by res judicata. This is the first times these
claims have been brought by Gillmor and the first time all landowners who block
her access have been included in any legal action. Additionally, Rule 11 was not
violated and sanctions should not have been awarded. The Court of Appeals
should reverse both Orders below, and return the case to the District Court for
further proceedings.
DATED this " H ^

day of January, 2009.

_Jhk
Dallis A. Nordstrom
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

NADINE G1LLMOR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FAMILY LINK, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company, DAVID K. RICHARDS,
an individual, BARRY TODD MILLER, an
individual, JOAN ELLEN MILLER, an
individual, DOUG CARL DOHRING, as an
individual and as Trustee, LAURIE ANN
DOHRING, as an individual, KENNETH W.
MACEY, an individual, ROBIN A. MACEY,
an individual, and JOHN DOES 1-40,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 070500385
Judge Robert K Hilder

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment came before
Judge Robert K. Milder on December 19, 2007. Plaintiff Nadine Gillmor was represented by
Bruce R. Baird. Defendants Family Link, LLC, Robin Macey and Ken Macey (collectively the
"Maceys") were represented by Keith Meade, defendant David K. Richards ("Richards") was
represented by Elizabeth T. Dunning and defendants Doug Carl Dohring and Laurie Ann
Dohring (the "Dohrings") were represented by Edwin C. Barnes. Having considered the
pleadings and the argument of counsel and for good cause shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of res judicata is granted as to both

claims made in Plaintiffs Complaint, and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Res
judicata bars all claims that were or could have been brought in prior litigation between the same
parties or their privies concerning the same operative facts or controversy. Plaintiffs claims in
this case could have been brought in Gillmor v. Macey el al, Civil No. 010600155, Third
District Court 2001, or in Gillmor v. Richards, Civil No. 8065, Third District Court, 1984.
2.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis of judicial estoppel is denied.

Plaintiff did not obtain relief in prior litigation based on any position which she is denying in this
case.
3.

The Court, having decided to dismiss both of Plaintiff s claims on the basis of ray

judicata, does not reach Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claim for condemnation on
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the separate bases that Plaintiff has no authority to condemn Defendants' property and the
proposed condemnation is not for a public use.
3.

Plaintiffs Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on her claim for

condemnation is denied as moot given the Court's ruling dismissing Plaintiffs Complaim with
prejudice.
a^<^y^
.*"
DATED t h i s / ^ "day of^*maryr2008.

Rob6rt K. Milder

APPROVE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS was mailed, postage fully
prepaid, on the /^/

day of February, 2008 to the following:

Bruce R. Baird
IIUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL PLLC
9537 South 700 East
Sandy, UT 84070
Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Edwin C. Barnes
Christopher B. Snow
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

' n'rcf Judicial District
J

SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UL - 1 2008

SUMMIT COUNTY

NADINE GILLMOR,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER
(Rule 11)

vs.

FAMILY LINK, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company, DAVID KL RICHARDS,
an individual, BARRY TODD MILLER, an
individual, JOAJN ELLEN MILLER, an
individual, DOUG CARL DOHRING, as
an individual and as Trustee, LAURIE
ANN DOHRING, an individual, KENNETH
W. MACEY, an individual, ROBIN A.
MACEY, an individual, and JOHN DOES
1-40,

Civil No. 070500385

Judge Robert K Hilder

Defendants.

All defendants in this action except Barry Todd Miller and Joan Ellen Miller have
requested Rule 113 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions against plaintiff Nadine Gillmor and
her attorney, Bruce R. Baird. Defendants Family Link and the Maceys (hereinafter "Maceys"),
and defendant David K. Richards (hereinafter "Richards") filed the initial Motion jointly, and
counsel for these defendants have taken the laboring oar in briefing and arguing the Motion.
Defendants Doug Dohring and Laurie Dohring (hereinafter "Dobrings") subsequently joined in
the otlier defendants5 Motion, but Dobrings did not add any independent analysis to the briefing. I
also note that counsel for Maceys and Richards are the same counsel who represented these
1
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parties in.the prior 2001 litigation (Nadine Gilhnor v. Family Link, et ah, Summit County Civil
No. 010600155) that played a critical part in my dismissal of this case on defendants' Motion,
and that now plays an important part in determination of the present Rule 11 Motion, I also note
that I was the trial judge for that action. Mr. Baird was not Ms. Gillmor's counsel in that action.
The Motion was argued to me on April 4, 2008, and should have been decided before this
date. I apologize to counsel and parties for the delay, but as I explained at the close of argument, I
can think of few more difficult decisions than one that raises the spectre of sanctions against a
respected and able member of the Bar, and I have taken perhaps excessive care in researching and
deciding this matter for that reason.
BACKGROUND
The present Motion for Rule 11 sanctions arises from plaintiffs Complaint in this action,
which asserts two Causes of Action. The first is styled "Condemnation," and the second
"Declaration of Highway by Use." The Complaint was filed July 12, 2007. Defendants moved to
dismiss the claims, and plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Following
argument on December 19, 2007,1 dismissed both claims on the basis of res judicata (the 2001
action), and denied plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. I denied defendants'
Motion to Dismiss on the alternative grounds of judicial estoppel, and because I decided the
Motion based on res judicata, I expressly did not reach defendants' separate claims that the Cause
of Action for condemnation should be dismissed because (1) plaintiff has no authority to condemn
defendants' property, or (2) the proposed condemnation is not for a public use. (See Order
entered Februaiy 20, 2008).
I will not recite fee history of this case. It is well-summarized in the briefing, and for more
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details reference should be made to my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 23,
2002, and the Judgment dated and entered September 24,2002, in the prior action, and the
subsequent Court of Appeals opinion found at 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57 (UtCtApp. 2005).
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF RULE 11
Although defendants* original Motion at least referaiced Rule 11(b)(2) (non-frivolous
basis in law) and (3) (factual claims must have evidentiary support) (Memorandum in Support
dated August 6, 2007, p. 6), as the briefing evolved (and after the court granted the Motion to
Dismiss), the focus shifted to Rule 11(b)(1) (improper purpose) and (2) (non-frivolous basis in
law). (Reply Memorandum dated March 5, 2008) Defendants identify factual problems
contained in plaintiffs arguments opposing the sanctions Motion, but they do not specifically
argue that the tacts alleged m the Complaint initiating *Vnc ^Hion lack evidentiary support or "are
[not] likely to .have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery/ (Kuie Li(p)(i)).
After considering all of the filings in this case, I cannot say that the facts underlying the
nineteen specific allegations in the Complaint are not likely to have evidentiary support (which is
not the same as saying those facts would be persuasive, but that is not the standard), particularly in
light of the more than 100 years of history upon which plaintiff appears to rely. The one
allegation that skates closest to the line is No. 1: "Gillmor's property is essentially landlocked."
That allegation appears inconsistent with my Findings of Fact m the prior action, but die word
"essentially" at least opens (lie door to a determination through investigation and discovery that
the alternate routes are so impractical, at least for the purposes desired, that the land may be
"essentially" landlocked Defendants also note that the defendants are not all of the surrounding

landowners, but that suggestion appears only in a memorandum, and not in the Complaint. At
paragraphs 16 and 17 plaintiff makes the relevant allegations; namely, that defendants own the
land between plaintiffs property and the Weber Canyon Road, and that the Perdue Creek and Neil
Creek roads run across defendants' properties. These are probably accurate statements.
For the foregoing reasons, I will not analyze the Rule 11 Motion under sub-sections (b)(3)
or (4), but will limit analysis to sub-sections (b)(1) and (2). With this in mind, I note that any
monetary sanctions under subsection (b)(2) may only be imposed on counsel, Mr. Baird, but that
if Ifinda violation of subsection (b)(1), sanctions (monetary or other) may be assessed against
either or both Ms. Gillmor and Mr. Baird. (Rule 11(c)(2)(A), U.R.C.P.)
IMPROPER PURPOSE, RULE 11 (b)(l)
The Rule states that an action may "not [be] presented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." Rule
11(b)(1).
The defendants bear the burden of showing the improper purpose. The recent case law
(since at least 1998 with the Pennington case, through 2005 with Mt. Vida) creates some
confusion, at least in my mind, whether a Rule 11(b)(1) claim requires a showing of subjective
bad faith^ There is no question, either now or in 1998, that under the previously codified § 78-2756 (now § 78B-5-825), an action must be without merit, and brought m bad faith (or an absence of
good faith) and the standard is subjective good or bad faith. See, Pennington v. Allstate, 973 P.2d
932, 938, n 3 (Utah 1998), Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah 1983), and Still Standing
Stable, LLC, v. Allen. 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005).
Plaintiff argues that the standard is the same under both § 78-27-56 and Rule ] 1(b)(1).
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Defendants argue that it is not. Both have support. In Pennington, the court stated that: "[RJule
11 sanctions do not require a party to act with a lack of good faith/' 973 P.3d at 938, n.3. In Mt.
Vida Enterprises v. Steen, 2005 UT App. 400, 122 P.3d 144 (Ut.Ct.App. 2005), the Court of
Appeals stated that: u[B]oth of these theories [Rule 11 and abuse of process], like Utah Code
section 78-27-56(1), would require a showing of bad faith or its equivalent." Id. at 149, n.6.
I cannot readily reconcile the two cases, except to note that one is the Utah Supreme court,
and it should control, but perhaps the difference is not material in this case. That is, all cases that
address the improper purpose standard under either Rule 11(b)(1) or the statute appear to treat the
issue as one of fact, see, e.g. Pennington, 973 P.2d at 936, which implies an evidentiary hearing
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(either the underlying trial or a specific hearing on the fee motion), and I have never awarded §
78-27-56 fees without such a hearing.1
The language of Rule 11(b)(1) (set forth above) suggests at least some overlap between the
standards of the Rule, and § 78-27-56. That is, Utah courts have defined the statutory standard
with some specificity: To show a lack of good faith, or the existence of bad faith, for purposes of
§ 78-27-56, it must be shown that one of the following three factors is lacking:
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the
activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others.
Still Standing Stable, 122 P.3d at 560 (quoting In re Sonnenreich. 2004 UT 3, ] 48, 86 P.3d 712
(Utah 2004).

Under § 78-27-56, the necessary bad faith inquiry is identified in Cadv v, Johnson, 671 P.2d
149 (Utah 1983) and subsequent cases. It is not a simple standard, it is factual, and parties have been
warned by (he Utah Supreme Court to avoid conflating the two requirements of lack of merit and bad
faith into one. See Still Standing Stable. LLC, v. Allen, 2005 UT 46, 122 P.3d 556, 560-61 (Utah 2005).
5
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Whether the standard is subjective bad faith, as identified, above, or objective improper
purpose, the record in this case does not provide a sufficient basis to attribute either such motive
to plaintiff or Mr. Band. In the present case, I see no evidence of a purpose to harass, delay or
impose unnecessary cost. The purpose is clear-to obtain access that has not been obtained
through previously advanced theories. Neitiier can I find sufficient evidence in the record to show
the absence of an honest belief that the action might be justified, or thai the action was filed to
take unconscionable advantage of defendants. There is no question that the action (the present
and prior actions, in fact) have cost defendants very large sums, but 1 .cannot conclude that there
was ever, now or in the past, a purpose to needlessly increase the costs of litigation,
Finally, I note that defendants point to statements of what actions may be brought in the
future, by other parties who may or may not be represented by Mr. Baird, but until such actions
arefiledthere is no way for this court to assess the merits of such actions, and I do not see how
the threat of such actions shows the improper purpose required by the Rule. Excessive zeal in a
cause is not necessarily an improper purpose or evidence of bad faith, and I hereby DENY the
sanctions Motion based on Rule 11(b)(1), U.R.C J\ What may require sanctions, however, is an
action prompted by sucn zeal, but which cannot be legally justified by this plaintiff against these
defendants, and that is the next inquiry.
WITHOUT BASIS IN LAW, RULE 11(b)(2)
I start this section by clarifying that I am not now addressing whether the two claims
advanced by plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor, have any basis in law, or a in a reasonable extension of
existing law. For the sake of argument (but only for that purpose) I will concede that one or both
theories, highway by use or private condemnation, may be viable. The sole inquiry hi the context
6
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of this case, with its mexlncable ties to the prioi action (and, indeed, to the settlement of the 1984
action that is icferenced throughout the record), is whether Nadme Gillmor had a basis in law, 01
m a reasonable extension of existing law, to bung a new action seeking increased access to her
pioperty ovei and across the defendants' pioperties Stated a little differently, is there an
objectively ieasonable basis m law justifying this new appioach to Ms Gillmoi's appaiently
intractable pioblem of how to obtain access to hei property that meets hei needs and desires?
I will start by sketching the law of les judicata
The doctnne of res judicata serves the impoitant policy of preventing previously
litigated issues fiom being lehtigated Res judicata encompasses two distinct doctunes
claim preclusion and issue preclusion
Generally, claim preclusion bais a party from piosecutmg m a subsequent action a
claim that has been fully litigated previously In oider for a claim to be piecluded undei
this doctnne the paity seeking preclusion must establish three elements
Fust, both cases must involve the same parties or then pnvies Second the claim
that is alleged to be baned must have been piesentcd m the first suit 01 be one that
could and should have been 1 aised in the first action Third, the fust suit must
have lesulted m a final judgment on the meats
Snvdeiv Murray City Corporation. 2003 UT 13, % 34, 73 P 3d 325, 332 (Utah 2003) (all internal
citations omitted, emphasis added)
I will not define issue nr^Hmirm because that doctrine is not the specific bai to plaintiffs
piesent action Addressing the three elements of claim preclusion (1) This action involves the
same parties and/oi privies as the pnoi action (2) The claim foi access ovei the pioperties was
the heart of the pnoi action It is plaintiffs aigument that (a) the piesent legal theories supporting
access weie not presented m the pnoi action, which they were not, and (b) there was no need to
aigue the piesent theories until this court and the Utah Court of Appeals ruled against plaintiffs
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claims which were advanced through different theories. Both arguments fail, because the present
arguments were always available (and according to plaintiff they have been legally and factually
available for many decades), and the claims or theories could and should have been presented in
Hiefirstcase, either as alternative theories, or as the theories that best fit the facts alleged. (3)
There is no question that the prior action was folly adjudicated, at trial, on appeal to the Utah
Court of Appeals, and through denial of a writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court.
The foregoing is a brief statement of this court's reason for dismissing the present action,
and I am at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought the present action without
violating Rule 11(b)(2), U.RCi\ That is, once the three elements are satisfied, I am unaware of
any exceptions to application of the bar imposed by res judicata, and plaintiff has not identified
any such exception. She argues, as already noted, 1hatfterpresent "legal causes of action . .. were
utterly unnecessary" until the Court of Appeals mled against her, but that argument only suggests
that litigation choices were made, as they should be, and not every possible theory was advanced.
Nevertheless, the claim for access was aggressively pursued, and resolved. Res judicata has
several purposes, one of which is "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits/*
Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P. 845 P.2D 944, 946 (Ut.CtApp. 1992).
If an appellate court disagrees with my application of the doctrine of res judicata to the
present action, then any determination of a violation of Rule 11(b)(2), and imposition of
sanctions, will be similarly flawed, but unless and until that happens, I am constrained to follow
ibe logic of the underlying dismissal, and my analysis of Rule 11(b)(2), to find that the present
action was filed in contravention ol the Rule, l note the particular force of Schoney v. Memorial
EstatesvInc, 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Ut.ui./^p. 1993), in support of this conclusion,
8
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To summarize, I do not disagree that Mr. Baird's research of underlying theories may not,
in fact, beflawedperse. Indeed, one or both theories may support his conclusion that some
plaintiff, some day, may have an argument for a highway by use or private condemnation claim. I
do not reach that issue. The flaw in the filing is that this plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor, may not now
bring such a claim, because of the prior fully litigated claims between these parties or their
privies The res judicata bar is clear, it is ancient, and it applies conclusively in this case. Ms.
Gillmor has had her day in court on the claims presented in this action, albeit presented now in a
new form.
SANCTIONS
Because the only Rule violated in this case is Rule 11(b)(2), a monetary sanction may not
be imposed against Ms. Gillmor. Monetary sanctions may be imposed against Mr. Baird, counsel
for plaintiff, and other sanctions may be imposed against either or both Mr. Baird and Ms,
Gillmor. The Rule specifically provides that: ilA sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by
others similarly situated." (Rule 11(c)(2)) Sanctions may include "an order directing payment of
some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the
violation.5' Id.
Defendants have all sought payment of attorney's fees, and the affidavits to date support
very substantial amounts incurred, all related to thefilingof this action and defendants* successful
motions to dismiss. The courts have, however, given guidance on the meaning oi.the-sanctkin^
language, and the purpose of sanctions, which guidance persuades me that an award of all hes and
costs is not mandated by the Rule, and this court should exercise its sound discretion in
9
32

determining the appropriate sanction. See, e.g. Pennington v. Allstate, y/3 jf.2d yj2, y3y (Utah
1998), and Schonev v. Memorial Estates, Inc. 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Ut.Ct.App. 1993). Specifically, "a
violation of Rule 11(b) does not mandate the sanction of attorney fees/' Crank v. The Utah
Judicial Council 2001 UT 8, 20 P.3d 307, 316 (Utah 2001).
federaltfasesgive further direction. Some of the guiding principles include the following:
"The purpose of sanctions under Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings and streamline the
administration of justice Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). Sanctions
should therefore be educational and rehabilitative in character and, as such, tailored to the
particular wrong, Topalian v Ehiman. 3 F.3d 931, 936-37 (5Jh Cir. 1993)." Jordaan v. Hall, 275
F.Supp.2d 778, 790-91 (RD.Tex. 2003). Finally, "Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting statute in the
sense that the loser pays. It is a law imposing sanctions if counselfileswith improper motives or
inadequate investigation.5' Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Qr
1989) {en banc).
In tins case, plaintiff did not obtain the properly access she sought in the 2001 action,
which in turn interpreted the settlement agreement arising from a 1984 action. In this action, new
and experienced counsel advanced theories not asserted in Ube prior action, but which could have
been, in an attempt to gain rights of access probably even greater than argued for in the 2001
action, or bargained for in prior agreements. 1 have found that the action is not legally justified, at
least not an action brought by JMadine Gillmor to expand her access rights across the land owned
by defendants. Nothing in the proceedings in this action persuades mc that Ms, Gillmor will seek
personally to advance such an action in her name, but it is patently clear that she may seek to
create certain rights to access through others. I do not see how sanctions seeking to deter Ms,
10
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Gillmor or Mr. Baixd from such an effort are justified by Rule 11 if the action is otherwise
justified, but a sanction should be imposed in this case, pursuant to the Rule, to deter others
generally from bringing claims barred by either claim preclusion or issue preclusion, when all the
elements are present.
I determine that Mr, Baird, counsel for plaintiff, shall pay $5,000 each to the Macey and
Richards defendants, and $2,500 to the Dohring defendants, for a total of $12,500.00. As an
additional sanction, Nadine Gillmor is hereby enjoined from filing any further action seeking
access to her property, or modification of the access she presently enjoys, across any of the
defendants' properties unless she first seeks leave of court to file such an action, with notice to all
intended defendants, ha any request for such leave, Ms. Gillmor is ordered to reveal the full
history of agreements and litigation, including tire 2001 action, this action, and the sanctions
imposed herein.
No further Order is required, but defendants' counsel shall prepare appropriate Judgments
based on this Order, which judgments will provide for post-judgment interest at tire 2008 rate
from the date of this Order. The court, however, further Orders -that any execution of judgments
shall be stayed until the appeal time from this Order and the underlying dismissal Order has
expired. If a timely appeal is filed, then plaintiff shall have ten business davs to seek a further stay
on appeal, and the parties may address the issue of any appropriate bond at that time.
DATBD this 30th day of June, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
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Elizabeth T. Dunning (3896)
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
299 South Main, Ste. 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone; 801-521-5800
Facsimile: 801-521-9639
Attorneys for David K. Richards
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
NADINE GILLMOR,
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vs.
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FAMILY LINK, LLC, a Utah Limited
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Defendants.
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This matter came before the Court on December 19,2007, on defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. Family Link, LLC, Kenneth W. Macey
and Robin A. Macey (the "Maceys") were represented by Keith W, Meade. David K. Richards
("Richards5') was represented by Elizabeth T, Dunning, Doug Carl Dohring and Laurie Ann
Dohring (the "Dohrings") were represented by Edwin C. Barnes. Plaintiff Nadine Gillmor
("Gillmor") was represented by Bruce R. Baird, At the conclusion of fee hearing, the Court
granted defendants' Motion. The Court's ruling was memorialized in an Order, dated February
19, 2008. Thereafter, the Maceys and Richards, joined by the Dohrings, moved for sanctions
against Gillmor and her counsel pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The Court heard
argument on defendants' Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to U.R.C.P 11 on April 4, 2008, and
entered its Ruling and Order on July 1,2008, granting in part and denying in part defendants'
Motion,
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits;

2.

The Maceys are awarded $5,000 against Bruce R. Baird;

3.

Richards is awarded $5,000 against Bruce R. Baird;

4.

The Dohrings are awarded $2,500 against Bruce R. Baird;

5.

Plaintiff Gillmor is hereby enjoined from filing any further action seeking

access to her property or modification of the access she presently enjoys, across any of
the Defendants' properties, unless she first seeks leave of court to file such action, with
notice to all intended defendants. In any request for such leave to file suit, Gillmor must
237
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reveal the full history of agreements and litigation, including the 2001 action, this action
and the sanctions imposed by this Judgment,
6.

The monetary awards shall bear interest at the post-judgment rale

beginning July 1,2008 until satisfied,
7,

Defendants are awarded their costs.

Dated M^°

day ofJkd5^£008.
BY THE COURT:

BKncfrable Robert K. Hilder
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Bruce R. Baird
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the %$> day of July, 2008, to the
following:
Bruce R. Baird
HUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL PLLC
9537 South 700 East
Sandy, UT 84070
Edwin C. Barnes
Christopher B. Snow
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Ktiih W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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